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Abstract. For a long period the study of European interest group politics remained somewhat disconnected from 
other areas of European Union studies. There exists little cross-fertilization between the burgeoning literature on 
European party politics and political cleavages, on the one hand, and the literature on European interest groups, on 
the other hand. Although, recent scholarship has moved towards a more comparative approach, researchers still do 
not pay much attention to the possibility that a small number of political cleavages shapes the emerging European 
interest group system. This paper, which is part of a larger ongoing research project, aims to connect the study of 
interest group politics with the literature on party politics and political cleavages. The empirical corpus of the paper 
analyses data on political support networks among interest groups and political parties and uses German, Dutch, 
French, Belgian and EU-level elite survey-data. More in particular, I demonstrate that support networks between 
interest groups and political parties are structured according to traditional party political cleavages.  
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  1Introduction 
For a long time the study of European interest group politics has remained disconnected 
or ‘ghetto-ized’ from other sub-areas within the study of the European Union (EU), on the one 
hand, and from the general study of interest groups, on the other hand (Green-Cowles 2003; Woll 
2006). Early studies of EU interest groups were inspired by the growing number interest group 
population in Brussels and most of these studies were primarily concerned with the mapping of 
an emerging interest groups system. Although empirically rich, most studies were characterized 
by ‘theoretical poverty’ and linkages to the comparative and general political science literature on 
interest groups were usually absent. The recent literature on EU interest groups goes beyond 
questions about the development and evolution of the EU interest group system and, therefore, it 
is broader in outlook. Several studies are conducted on the conditions under which and processes 
through which European interest groups mobilize (Wessels 2004; Mahoney 2004), which 
institutional configurations promote or constrain access, the resources and strategies affecting 
access (Bouwen 2002; Beyers 2004), which channels and levels are most likely to be used 
(Bennet 1999; Beyers 2002: Eising 2004), the stages during which lobbying will be most 
effective (Crombez 2002) and how specific actor properties, such as the distinction between 
public interests and business interests, shape access (Pollack 1997; Beyers 2002, 2004; Mahoney 
2004).  
In this paper, I address a topic which, although it is central to many fields of political 
science, has received little attention from interest groups scholars: the structure of conflict and 
consensus. I believe that a more explicit and thorough linkage of interest group politics with the 
overall structure of conflict in a polity is crucial in order to understand the role of advocates in a 
broader political context. Despite the publication of excellent special issues and edited volumes 
with chapters on social movements, interest groups and political parties (see for instance Marks 
and Steenbergen 2004), the cross-fertilization between the literature on EU party political 
cleavages, on the one hand, and the EU interest group literature, on the other hand, has remained 
limited. In order to map political parties in a political space students of party politics rely on party 
manifestos and public opinion data; very few scholars map parties in a political space by taking 
into account the interactions between political parties, government officials and interest groups 
(exceptions include Wessels 2004, Beyers and Kerremans 2004). Most studies deal with one type 
of political organization (often parties) and then make indirect inferences with regard to the other 
  2type (for instance interest groups). Often the literature reads as if these two types of political re-
presentation – parties and interest groups – exist near each other; they do not share fundamental 
ideological niches.  
This observation is not only confined to the literature on EU interest groups. While the 
traditional pluralist scholars such as Bentley, Truman and Key put group conflict at the core of 
their thinking and often combined the study of political parties and interest groups, few 
contemporary scholars of politics link the study of party politics and interest group politics (see 
for instance Heinz et al. 1993, 247-9; Clifton 2004, 475-7). The reason for this limited attention 
has perhaps to do with the lack of empirical data and/or the difficulties in gathering such data. 
While political parties and party systems can be analyzed by using data on roll call votes or 
electoral behavior, the basic problem with interest groups is the absence of readily observed 
behavior. Interest group behavior is multifarious and there is no single logic which defines the 
maintenance and activities of interest groups. Moreover, the concept ‘interest group’ covers an 
very heterogeneous set of organizations which makes it difficult to delineate the field of study.  
As a result, interest group scholars face difficulties in analyzing systematically why and 
how interest groups interact as well as how coalitions among groups are structured. While there is 
plenty of positive theory which suggests that political influence is based on exchange relations, 
there is little empirical research that systematically demonstrates and explains the emergence and 
development of exchange networks. Most explanations have a functionalist flavor whereby 
exchanges are seen as a transaction of something from x to y whereby x expects that y takes into 
account something that is valuable and of interest for x. Money, information, expertise is 
exchanged in return for access, attention or influence. So influence, access and attention are a 
function of exchanges. However, transactions are plagued by uncertainties about how much the 
seeker of influence, x, can trust y; y may free ride, take the resource and ignore x interests. Such 
uncertainties decrease the likelihood of exchanges as well as the potential surplus or added value 
that result from exchanges. Yet, a large literature in sociology and political science elaborates 
how the structural embeddedness of actors in networks of continuing relations increases the 
likelihood of trustful and effective transactions. Because of long-term experiences with the 
exchange of resources, political support as well as friendship, stable networks and coalitions can 
emerge within a system of interest intermediation which includes parties and interest groups.  
  3This paper analyzes the structure of these long-term support networks in which interest 
groups are involved and I argue that interest intermediation can be modeled along a 
dimensionality that reflects party political cleavages. In the next section, I sketch the rationale for 
connecting the study of party politics with interest group politics. This section is part of a larger 
project in which I hope to build a comprehensive theoretical framework which explains how 
interest groups seek allies, how they try to persuade opponents and how they seek to influence 
government policies. Then I present the research design. The empirical corpus of the paper 
analyses data on political support networks among interest groups and political parties in the field 
of trade policymaking. I demonstrate that support networks between interest groups and political 
parties are structured according to a dimensionality that reflects party political cleavages. More in 
particular, I conclude that the structure of conflict with regard to trade policies is consistent with 
a left-right structure which encompasses three alliances; a labor or social policy coalition, a pro-
growth or business coalition and a pro-sustainability coalition.  
 
Why should we study party political cleavages and interest group politics? 
Why is a deeper understanding of the interaction between interest groups and political 
parties needed? One of the reasons is that, as suggested above, knowledge about the stable 
patterns of ideological contention may lead to a better understanding of daily political practices 
of interest groups. For instance, interest groups seek exchanges with political parties that have a 
similar ideological profile. Or, groups may perhaps try to convince and lobby party leaders with 
opposing political views. Although both examples – lobbying allies versus lobbying opponents – 
exemplify different behavioral patterns, both cases implicate the existence of a cleavage pattern 
that structures interactions. Yet, despite the fact that many studies demonstrate the emergence a 
European political cleavage space which resembles domestically mobilized cleavages, the 
literature on EU politics remains inconclusive regarding the relationship between interest group 
politics, party politics and political cleavages.  
On the one hand, the EU-polity potentially depoliticizes issues as bureaucrats and non-
majoritarian institutions play a key role in the policy-making process. Much legislative and 
executive work is done in bureaucratic committees such as the Council working groups, 
comitology committees and expert committees (Hix 1999, 31). Furthermore, regulatory policies 
occupy a prominent place in the activities of the EU. Because such policies are often considered 
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decisive factors for network formation in the EU cannot be neglected. All this has led to a policy-
style among interest groups which is often described as less political, less publicly visible and 
less aggressive compared to lobbying in the United States (US) (Mahoney 2005). So, compared 
to their colleagues in Washington, EU interest groups – as specialized and more functional 
organizations – should be less confrontational, prefer inside-lobbying instead of grass-roots 
lobbying and avoid ideological statements. On the other hand, recent studies have shown that the 
ideological views of actors (parties, social movements and bureaucrats) involved in European 
policy-making matter. Although opinions diverge on the way and the extent to which traditional 
left/right and new political cleavages are structurally related to issues arising from European 
integration, the main thrust is that politics at the European level reflects domestically mobilized 
political cleavages (Hix and Lord 1997; Hooghe 1999; Imig and Tarrow 2001; Gabel and Hix 
2002; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2002). Clearly, despite the 
potential for technocracy, a strong political component seems to be present in EU politics. 
Why is it plausible to assume the existence of a rather stable and enduring political space 
characterized by a sizeable number of dimensions? Why does not each separate issue or actor 
represent an idiosyncratic policy view based on technical expertise (as many policy issues require 
specialized knowledge and can have different implications for varying constituencies)? And, why 
should the interaction between interest groups and political parties be of any importance?  As it 
would require an entire book to elaborate these issues, I will limit myself to a brief summary of 
some key arguments. I start with outlining some social mechanisms which lead to a low-
dimensional political space. Then, I consider the role political parties and interest groups play in 
shaping the structure of a political space. I conclude this section with elaborating some 
propositions on the nature of political cleavages in the field of EU politics, in general, and trade 
policymaking, in particular.  
Why is politics not just a matter of a fluid structure with random coalitions that take into 
account the uniqueness of each separate issue? Why do policymakers often pursue policies which 
resemble already existing policies and why do they not continuously adopt new policies? All 
these questions suggest that the options available to policymakers are considerably limited. 
Contemporary political science generally considers political action as being significantly 
constrained by institutional rules as well as the more informal nature of the cognitive/ideological 
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characterizing present-day political science, a discipline strongly colored by the neo-
institutionalist turn of the early nineties. One of the puzzles for political science is the inherent 
instability and indecisiveness of systems with more than two voters and more than two separating 
issues (Riker 1982; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Continuously including new dimensions and 
decision-makers can indeed lead to instability. Institutionalists will explain political stability by 
pointing at the fact that the dimensionality of political conflict is institutionally constrained and 
by formal institutional mechanisms which organize the order in which decisions are made, 
establish voting procedures and regulate the access of interest parties. Many of such institutional 
devices are based on formal rules which are often, but not always, laid down in constitutional 
law.  
In addition to formal devices, stability is also enhanced by the fact that usually new (and 
recurrent) issues are defined so that they include a single dimension of conflict or that new issues 
are interpreted in light of existing cleavages. Political scientist have used the notion of bounded 
rationality in order to understand this: as the computational abilities of actors are limited and as 
access to information is restricted, actors try to understand new issues within existing frames of 
reference. Another reason for inherent stability concerns the path-dependent character of political 
choices that originated in the past. For political parties, but also for interest groups, it is hard to 
abandon the existing party cleavage structure and to start thinking in entirely new terms. Parties 
and interest groups attract a politically motivated constituency that benefits from the policies they 
support and, therefore, abandoning existing policies by adopting new policies or drastically 
changing a prevailing policy view may harm the party’s or interest group’s reputation among 
crucial constituencies. In sum, cleavages concern ‘the ways in which custody of symbolic content 
of the domain is distributed among its participants’ and they ‘impose limits on the range of 
arguments that are permissible, legitimate, and likely to be accepted as valid frames for the 
controversy in any given situation’ (Laumann and Knoke 1987, 315). 
Traditionally, political cleavages were organized by political parties and in studying 
cleavages most political scientist have concentrated on party politics (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993, 21). This is a logical research strategy as especially parties, and not interest groups, are 
crucial in shaping legislative and executive politics. However, this does not mean that cleavages 
only emerge or develop as a result of partisan politics or that they are limited to the partisan 
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other arenas such as the arena of interest group and bureaucratic politics. In addition, politicians 
are key ideological labelers as they regularly comment on specific issues. In doing this they 
establish ideological significance and mobilize sympathizers and antagonists on the basis of 
ideology. Interest group officials have to take into account such information when they establish 
networks with politicians. Party political cleavages do not only differentiate political parties into 
different clusters, but they may also be important devices which shape interest group activity. 
The more actors outside the partisan arena take into consideration the ideological labels attached 
to political parties, the more ideological cleavages are indeed enduring features of politics.  
Also political parties consider the political activities of interest groups as salient. Quite 
regularly political ideas and beliefs originate outside the partisan arena and are later on, once they 
have the potential of conveying electoral advantage, drawn into partisan conflict. It is well-known 
that that the electoral success of parties can be significantly affected by grass-roots support 
mobilized by interest groups (for instance, the Christian Right and the Republicans in the US) 
and that the emergence of new parties is quite often related to previous interest group 
mobilization (for instance, the green parties and new social movements in several European 
countries). Parties generally rely on interest groups in order to gain information about important 
parts of their electoral constituency and in some political systems interest groups play a key role 
mobilizing voters. Finally, political parties may lack sufficient information and knowledge about 
the distribution of costs and benefits of the policies they are contemplating or the political risks 
that such a distribution may entail (Majone 1996, 268). Interest groups, with their more 
specialized and functional profile, are able to provide this sort of information to political parties, 
information political parties will often find difficult to collect themselves.  
  If political cleavages – stable structural patterns of conflict and consensus in a political 
system – are a persistent and recurring feature of politics, then they are not necessarily confined 
to partisan politics. As mentioned above, political cleavages, if they are salient, may spill over 
into other arenas, including the supranational or international arena. Since the mid-nineties many 
scholars started to investigate the political cleavage structure of EU politics. The importance of 
this research program lies in the fact that it demonstrated the persistent nature of party cleavages 
for an arena where traditional party politics was assumed to be less relevant. Traditional 
approaches, such as intergovernmentalism or neo-functionalism, do not expect that party 
  7cleavages play a significant role at the supranational level and suppose, albeit for different 
reasons, that EU-politics remains divorced from party cleavages. These approaches suppose that 
the EU political space is primarily structured by a cleavage between support for and opposition to 
European integration and not by a left-right political divide.  
However, because the policy issues the EU deals with are not neutral in terms of 
distribution and redistribution, the cleavage pro or contra European integration is an insufficient 
or incomplete representation of the European political space. Scharpf, for instance, demonstrates 
that product and process-related regulations generate different distributional pay-offs (1996; 
1997, 133). Likewise, Pollack shows that the member states have delegated powers to 
supranational institutions like the Commission and the Court of Justice in areas where policies 
impose concentrated costs and diffuse benefits for different societal groups (2003, 66 and 105-6). 
Examples are competition and external trade policies. These policies impose costs on 
concentrated economic interests, but may lead to diffuse benefits in the form of competitive 
markets and consumer choice. Not only concentrated interests facing direct costs and benefits 
will become active. Groups representing societal preferences not directly related to material self-
interests may also organize mobilization of support and opposition. People may have strong 
feelings about the interests of ‘others’ (for instance the poor, the developing countries) or about 
diffuse issues such as sustainable development (Salisbury 1969; Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 
69-70). There is thus, a high potential for interest mobilization on EU policy issues, for attempts 
by organized interests and political parties to gain access to and politicize EU policymaking. In 
this paper, I hypothesize that a small number of dimensions dominates the political space, but I 
have less firm a-priori hypotheses regarding which dimension will dominate this space. Although 
Gabel and Hix identified the preponderance of a traditional socio-economic left-right dimension 
(2002), the findings of Hooghe et al. suggest that a coalition mobilizing green/alternative/liberal 
values may start to take over (2002). The latter is consistent with other recent research on interest 
groups politics and their interactions with political institutions, research which showed that the 
structure of networks between interest groups and policymakers reflect a cleavage between a pro-
growth and a pro-sustainability coalition (Kriesi and Jegen, 2001; Beyers and Kerremans 2004). 
To my knowledge few scholars have studied whether a comparable structure of consensus 
and conflict exists within the context of other international organizations and their policies. This 
is not unlikely as the policies of organizations such as the World Trade Organizations (WTO), 
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OEDC) have considerable (re)-distributive 
implications. More in particular, the politics of trade has increasingly become vulnerable to 
contestation and concomitantly, to de-legitimization (Aaronson 2001). In short, trade policy, as a 
contentious policy area, is a fertile laboratory for studying interest group politics and agenda-
setting.
1 As Holland, referring to trade in the context of the EU, phrased it: ‘Trade has become 
pervasive, touching almost all aspects of EU policy, both internal and external’ (2002, 140). 
When reading the specialized political economy literature, one can distil two mechanisms which 
explain the emergence of stable political cleavages with regard to trade policies (Goldstein and 
Martin 2000; Meunier 2003; Aaronson 2004).  
  First, according to Goldstein and Martin, the legalization of the international trade regime 
affects the incentives of groups to mobilize. Increased rule precision causes more and better 
information about the distributional implications of trade agreements to become available so that 
it is now easier for groups to estimate the potential benefits of collective action (Goldstein and 
Martin 2000, 604; see also De Bièvre 2004). Moreover, Goldstein and Martin argue that such 
legalization particularly empowers protectionists’ interests as especially these interests benefit 
from the resulting informational asymmetry, given their usually lower information-gathering 
capacity in comparison with export-oriented groups (Goldstein and Martin 2000, 606). Second, 
traditionally trade policies were mainly about tariff-barriers, arguments about jobs, export 
opportunities, and how distributional losses could be compensated. Therefore, primarily export 
industries, industries that face import competition, and to some extent consumers were 
mobilized. Yet, because of the gradual lowering of tariff-barriers, behind-the-border regulatory 
barriers became more prominent in trade negotiations. Accordingly, domestic regulations which 
potentially distort trade became part of such negotiations. It concerns areas such as food safety, 
education, health care and cultural diversity, all contentious areas within many domestic polities. 
This means that a much broader set of political groups may have reasons to mobilize in 
favor/against trade liberalization or may seek compensation for losses. Therefore, it is likely that 
an increasing number of interest groups – including public interest groups such as environmental 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), human rights organizations and development NGOs – 
will search influence. In sum, the politics of trade has become more complicated and 
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and other key actors, such as political parties, in this political space? 
 
Research design 
The dataset used is part of a larger research project on how interest groups interact with 
public actors in four EU member states – Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands
2 – as 
well at the EU-level. The focus of the project is thereby on the efforts these groups make to 
influence the EU’s external trade policies in the WTO, more particularly in the areas of 
agriculture, steel/metal and services. One part of this larger project tries to find out whether and if 
so, how national interest groups have Europeanized their political strategies. Data collection has 
been based on an elite-survey conducted between May 2003 and February 2006. This section 
briefly outlines some basic features of the research design by indicating how the fieldwork was 
conducted and how interest groups were sampled. 
One of the problems with elite-surveying concerns the identification of a relevant sample 
of interest groups. As part of the research questions can only be dealt with in a comparative 
design, cross-sectional samples that are structurally equivalent and comparable across countries 
are needed. For each country and the EU-level it was aimed to get a final sample of 120 
completed interviews; 20 with public officials and 100 with interest groups.
3 In addition to this it 
was tried to get a diverse sample with a large variety of interest groups including NGOs, public 
interests, business interests and labor interests.  
Basically, the sample is constructed on the basis of a positional sampling technique for 
which a large amount of formal sources were screened.
4 From all these sources only interest 
groups were retained; think tanks, institutes, policy centers, media actors and individual firms 
were not considered. There is of course overlap among the different sources. Each interest group 
has been coded once as soon as the group was mentioned in one of the sources. All these interest 
groups were coded on the basis of a number of variables such as type of interests (employers, 
trade unions, NGOs), policy sector in which the group is active and so on. For this, a coding 
frame was established beforehand and coding occurred through an interactive process among the 
researchers that included an extensive consultation of external sources (such as monographs, 
websites and experts).  
  10The established list, however, does not correspond with a balanced cross-sectional sample 
that is structurally equivalent across countries. Two major problems had to be solved.  
First, the list was too large as it contains several highly specialized business interest 
groups that had no link at all to the policy-sectors on which the project focused (external trade 
policies with regard to agriculture, steel/metal and services). Regarding sectoral business and 
labor interests only those sectoral associations that have a direct (agriculture/food industry, 
metal/steel, services) or an indirect link (transport and retailing/distribution) with the policy 
sectors under investigation were retained. NGOs were retained in the sample as well as cross-
sectoral specific interest groups such as cross-sectoral employer unions, trade unions and 
associations representing small and medium enterprises (SME’s).  
Second, there was a risk that the sources would generate a biased sample with regard to 
access and mobilization; less visible and less active organizations run the risk to be excluded.
5 
This risk was particularly high for trade unions. Although trade unions play an active part in 
domestic politics (especially in neo-corporatist countries such as Belgium, Germany, or the 
Netherlands), they were barely named in the sources mentioned above (Beyers and Kerremans 
2007). In order to redress this potential bias, the following procedure was adopted: First, for all 
international and European umbrella organizations mentioned in one of the above sources, it was 
checked whether or not their European or domestic members were already included. If not, they 
were added. Second, for the three policy sectors, the potential cleavages were investigated so that 
the sample would include varying and/or opposing policy positions. In order to identify the actors 
connected to these cleavages the relational data-set compiled by Bernhard Wessels 
(Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin) which links Euro-level associations to their domestic members was 
used (Wessels 2004). Finally, a number of experts (especially with respect to trade unions) were 
consulted and the composition of key advisory bodies at the domestic and the EU-level (such as 
the EU’s Economic and Social Committee) was checked in order to fine-tune the sample with 
regard to trade unions.  
Table 1 gives an overview of the results of the fieldwork regarding the interviews with 
interest group officials in the four countries.
6 In the table a rough distinction is made between a) 
NGOs or public interest groups, b) economic/business and employers and c) trade unions. The 
first group consists of environmental NGOs, consumer NGOs, development NGOs and a small 
number of women’s organizations or organizations representing protest movements. The second 
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the field of agriculture, services and metal/steel) as well as small ‘businesses’ such as farmers, 
professions and small and medium enterprises. Under the category of trade unions both cross-
sectoral and sectoral employers’ associations are found. Although this categorization in three 
classes conceals much heterogeneity, it will be demonstrated that much variation in the sample 
corresponds to this rough distinction.  
 
Table 1. Overview of the sample and fieldwork results (Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, 
France and EU level) 
 Belgium  Netherlands  Germany  France  EU-level  Total 
NGOs/public interests 
- sample 
- n response (%) 
 
53 
44 (83%) 
 
37 
34 (92%) 
 
36 
28 (78%) 
 
38 
34 (89%) 
 
41 
37 (90%) 
 
205 
177 (86%) 
Economic/business/employers 
- sample 
- n response (%) 
 
87 
80 (92%) 
 
65 
57 (88%) 
 
73 
52 (71%) 
 
78 
62 (79%) 
 
79 
64 (81%) 
 
382 
315 (82%) 
Trade unions 
- sample 
- n response (%) 
 
29 
24 (83%) 
 
18 
16 (89%) 
 
13 
10 (77%) 
 
36 
32 (89%) 
 
12 
12 (100%) 
 
108 
94 (87%) 
Total 
- sample 
- n response (%) 
 
169 
148 (88%) 
 
120 
107 (89%) 
 
122 
90 (74%) 
 
152 
128 (84%) 
 
132 
113 (86%) 
 
695 
586 (84%) 
 
 
There is another aspect of the table which needs to be clarified, namely the fact that the 
sample size differs considerably from country to country. Especially the bigger sample of 
Belgium and France compared to the smaller sample for Germany is noteworthy. The sampling 
was aimed to be structurally equivalent and comparable across countries; this does not 
necessarily mean samples of an equal size. As such, specific institutional and political conditions 
within the four countries resulted in different sample sizes. Two factors explain the size of the 
Belgian sample. First, there is the specific nature of the Belgian federation which results in a 
fairly fragmented interest group system. For instance, whereas in most other countries there is 
only one environmental peak association, Belgium has four environmental peak associations, one 
for each of the sub-states (Bursens 1997). In addition to this, interest representation by labor 
unions is quite fragmented with different sectoral and cross-sectoral unions linked to the socialist, 
liberal and catholic pillars. The fragmentation of the trade union system is even more pronounced 
for France and explains the larger sample compared to Germany and, to some extent, the 
Netherlands. In Germany the existence of one big cross-sectoral trade union and its cross-sectoral 
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procedure in France led to the identification of 65 trade unions of which only 36 could be 
sampled.  
Interviews were conducted on the basis of a standardized questionnaire with almost all 
questions being closed. Key parts of the questionnaire dealt with different characteristics of the 
political system within which the actors operate, the policy positions of actors with respect to 
twenty policy issues, their political strategies (including both traditional forms of lobbying as 
well as outside lobbying) in relation to these issues, the resources actors had at their disposal and 
invested in political activities, and their embeddedness in domestic and/or European policy 
networks (by social network analysis).  
 
Interest group politics, party politics and cleavages 
In this paper only a subset of the variables are used. It concerns data on political support 
networks between interest groups and political parties and data on the political arguments interest 
groups used in their communication with policymakers and the broader public. These data allow 
me to present a spatial representation of the ideological similarities and the distances between 
different types of interest groups and political parties in four EU member states and the EU-level. 
The analysis consists of two steps. First, I explore the support networks between interest groups 
and parties as identified by interest group officials; this will be done by looking at the overall 
level of support interest groups receive from different parties as well as the overlap between these 
support networks. Second, I describe how the different political arguments co-vary with the type 
of interest group (e.g. trade unions, environment NGO et cetera), on the one hand, and the 
ideological affiliation of the interest groups, on the other hand. As I analyze several categorical 
variables which are difficult to cross-tabulate in a comprehensive form, I use correspondence 
analysis in order to represent the data in a multidimensional space.  
Towards the end of the interview interviewers asked the interest group officials from 
which political party they received most regular support with the following open question: In 
general, which of the political parties in the [Belgian, French, German, Dutch, European] 
Parliament are most supportive of the policy positions your organization pursues? The 
respondents could name as many parties as they want; each political party that could have been 
mentioned was coded as a separate variable. Table 2 shows the results and can be read as follows: 
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received regular support from the Belgian Francophone Christian-democrats (CDH: Centre 
Démocrate Humaniste).  
It should be kept in mind that is somewhat difficult to compare the results as we have not 
exactly the same political parties across countries. For instance, D66 is a left-liberal party within 
in the Netherlands, but at the EU-level it joins the other Dutch liberal party, the VVD (Volkspartij 
voor Vrijheid en Democratie), in the ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe). 
There are plenty of such examples which may complicate a comparison across cases. 
Nonetheless, some relevant observations can be made on the basis of these preliminary results. 
First of all, it is hard to find some relationship with the electoral clout of party or whether the 
party was in government/opposing during the period of the research (2003-2006). One could 
imagine that especially support form government parties or large/electoral strong parties will be 
recognized as valuable. Nonetheless, some smaller parties, especially the green parties, are 
important suppliers of political support and in some cases small partiers are perceived as being 
more important than large parties. On the other hand, some larger parties such as the Vlaams 
Belang in Belgium or the Front National in France barely supply support to interest groups. All 
this can mean different things. In some ways, one might argue that this mapping of interest 
groups does not reflect the current radical right-wing populist wave in Europe and that few 
interest group officials have ideological allegiances with extreme right of right-wing populist 
parties. Indeed, the existing interest group system seems to be quite moderate and maybe even 
centrist. Second, the importance of a large variety of parties, including some small parties without 
government experience, stems from the fact that interest group activity is usually not restricted to 
lobbying during the legislative of executive part of the policy process, but also concerns informal 
agenda-setting and the maintenance of long-term networks.  
Univariate distributions tell us little about the overlap in political support or the fact that 
interest groups receive support from different parties. Which combinations are more likely to 
occur? Do such combinations tell us something about ideological affinities? And, are there 
different combinations in the four countries and at the EU-level? For reasons of space I restrict 
the analysis to the parties which were by at least ten percent of the interviewees indicated as 
regular suppliers of support. This is also useful for substantive reasons. One could argue that 
primarily smaller or peripheral fringe parties generate political conflict and tend to support 
  14radical and ideologically motivated interest groups. In contrast, centrist and moderate parties will 
be tied to a much more diverse set of interest groups and will make less distinction on the basis of 
ideology only. By focusing on such parties I explore to what extent even the so-called political 
centre is characterized by some kind of cleavage structure. The five panels of table 3 present 
associations for each country and the EU-level. The higher the association, the more likely two 
parties were jointly identified as supplier of access to interest groups. No association means that 
occasionally two parties might have been identified together, but a systematic pattern of co-
occurrence is absent. A negative association signifies that support from party x means that there 
is generally no support from party y.  
 
Table 2. The amount of support interest groups receive from political parties 
 Belgian 
(n=148) 
Dutch  
(n=107) 
German 
(n=90) 
French 
(n=128) 
EU 
(n=113) 
  Francophone  Flemish      
Christian-democrats CDH 
34 (23%) 
CD&V 
49 (33%) 
CDA 
50 (56%) 
CDU/CSU 
36 (40%) 
UDF 
30 (23%) 
EPP-ED 
42 (37%) 
Social-democrats PS 
32 (22%) 
SP.a 
45 (31%) 
PVDA 
49 (46%) 
SPD 
21 (23%) 
PS 
53 (41%) 
PES 
44 (39%) 
Liberals MR 
43 (29%) 
VLD 
48 (33%) 
VVD 
48 (45%) 
FDP 
27 (30%) 
- ALDE 
24 (21%) 
Greens Ecolo 
32 (22%) 
Groen!  
36 (24%) 
Groenlinks 
39 (36%) 
Grüne 
24 (27%) 
Verts 
28 (22%) 
Greens/ALE 
28 (25%) 
Left liberals  Spirit 
18 (12%) 
- D66 
27 (25%) 
- - - 
Radical right  Vlaams 
Belang 
8 (5%) 
- LPF 
 
9 (8%) 
- FN 
 
1 (1%) 
- 
Radical left  -  -  SP 
19 (18%) 
PDS 
6 (7%) 
PCF 
21 (16%) 
PRG 
6 (5%) 
LO 
2 (2%) 
GEU/NL 
6 (5%) 
Christian 
Conservatives and 
nationalists 
- N-VA 
10 (7%) 
SGP 
8 (7%) 
Christenunie 
14 (13%) 
- MPF 
1 (1%) 
IND/DEM 
(1%)  
UEN 
1 (1%) 
Gaullists -  -    -  UMP 
21 (24%) 
- 
 
 
Despite differences in party systems (in terms of types of parties as well as the number of 
parties) it is noteworthy how similar the results are for the five cases. Nowhere, with the 
exception of Belgium, do we find a positive association between green parties, on the one hand, 
and right-wing or center-right parties, on the other hand; most associations are negative. The 
Belgian case is a bit odd because of the peculiar position of the Francophone Christian-
  15democrats. This party is positively associated with the Francophone greens (Ecolo), but also with 
other Belgian Francophone parties such as the PS (Parti Socialiste) and the liberal MR 
(Mouvement Réformateur). However, also in Belgium there is no or a negative association 
between the Flemish Christian-democrats (CD&V: Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams), the 
Flemish liberals (VLD: Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten), the Francophone MR, on the one 
hand, and the two green parties, on the other hand. 
Generally, the results show that if an interest group gains support from green parties, then 
support from liberals and Christian-democrats will usually be absent. The divergence generated 
by green parties is no surprise as green parties are often considered as being less centrists than 
Christian-democrats or social-democrats. But is this correct? Will we observe less divergence 
when we move closer to the centre, for instance to the social-democrats? Well, what we see is 
that the social-democrats generate a divergence that is similar to the green parties, a finding 
which is at odds with the notion that during the last two decades social-democrats increasingly 
moved to the centre (Kitschelt 1994, 1999). In most cases regular support from traditional social-
democrat parties corresponds with support from green parties and, to a lesser extent, support from 
radical left parties such as the communists in France or the radical left, the SP (Socialistische 
Partij), in the Netherlands. There is almost nowhere a positive association between support from 
social-democrats and liberal support; most coefficients are insignificant or negative. Also, regular 
support from social-democrats is hardly ever correlated with support from Christian-democrats 
and where there is an association, it tends to be rather low. Just as green and social-democrat 
support overlaps strongly, it appears that Christian-democrat and liberal support coincides very 
well. In most cases I find quite high association coefficients (between .27 and .72); coefficients 
which are generally higher than the occasional associations between social-democrat and 
Christian-democrat support.  
It is important to stress that these patterns bear no relationship whatsoever with the 
different government coalition patterns that were dominant during the period of the fieldwork. 
For instance, Belgium had a so-called purple coalition with liberals, social-democrats and (for 
some time) the green parties. In the Netherlands there was a centre-right coalition with the two 
liberal parties, the Christian-democrats and (for some time) the LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn). 
Germany had a green-social democratic coalition. Finally, France was governed by a centre-right 
coalition that included Gaullists and Christian-democrats. The irrelevance of coalition patterns 
  16suggests that the underlying cleavages are more enduring and persistent than what happens in 
daily politics.  
 
Table 3. Overlapping supply of support from political parties (Kendall tau) 
Panel A. Belgium (n=148) 
 CDH  SPA  PS  VLD  MR  Groen  Ecolo  Spirit 
CD&V .30 
(=.0003) 
ns ns .49 
(<.0001) 
.27 
(=.0009) 
ns ns ns 
CDH -  ns  .41 
(<.0001) 
ns .39 
(<.0001) 
ns .26 
(=.0018) 
ns 
SPA   -  .39 
(=.0004) 
ns -.20 
(=.0157) 
.62 
(<.0001) 
.19 
(=.0245) 
.52 
(<.0001) 
PS     -  -.19 
(=0206) 
ns ns .64 
(<.0001) 
ns 
VLD     -  .64 
(<.0001) 
-.19 
(=.0190) 
-.19 
(=.0206) 
ns 
MR      -  -.19 
(=.0201) 
ns ns 
Groen       -  .35 
(<.0001) 
.61 
(<.0001) 
Ecolo        -  .25 
(=.0020) 
Panel B. Netherlands (n=107) 
 PVDA  VVD  D66  Groenlinks  SP  Christenunie 
CDA ns  .42 
(<.0001) 
ns -.27 
(=.0057) 
ns ns 
PVDA -  -.26 
(=.0067) 
.20 
(=.0393) 
.43 
(<.0001) 
.21 
(=.0298) 
.20 
(=.0399) 
VVD   -  ns  -.56 
(<.0001) 
-.32 
(=.0010) 
ns 
 
D66     -  ns  ns 
 
ns 
 
Groenlinks     -  .46 
(<.0001) 
.22 
(=.0209) 
SP      -  .25 
(=.0087) 
Panel C. Germany  (n=90) 
 SPD  Grüne  FDP 
CDU/CSU ns  -.24 
(=.0260) 
.70 
(<.0001) 
SPD -  .44 
(<.0001) 
ns 
Grüne   -  -.28 
(=.0072) 
Panel D. France (n=128) 
 PS  Verts  UMP  PCF 
UDF .21 
(=.0186) 
-.20 
(=.0218) 
.72 
(<.0001) 
-.19 
(=.0277) 
PS -  .28 
(=.0014) 
.19 
(=.0312) 
.27 
(=.0023) 
Verts   -  -.25 
(=.0041) 
.22 
(=.0113) 
UMP     -  ns 
 
Panel E. European Union (n=113) 
 PES  ELDR  Greens-AEL 
EPP-ED Ns  .45 
(<.0001) 
-.40 
(<.0001) 
PES -  ns 
 
.47 
(<.0001) 
ELDR   -  ns 
 
 
  17Are different support relations related to different types of interest groups? And which 
political views and policy images are related to the underlying cleavage structure? Figures 1, 2 
and 3 provide us with a first answer. As there are no considerable differences between the five 
cases, the data are presented in one single overview. First, I cross-tabulate the categorization of 
interest groups with the supply of political support from four political groups; Christian-
democrats, social-democrats, liberals and greens. It is obvious that the type of interest group 
considerably correlates with the nature of support relations. Employers’ unions gain most support 
from liberal and Christian-democratic parties, while the latter supply more support to trade 
unions and NGOs compared to the liberals. But the most active supporters of trade unions and 
NGOs are the social-democrats and the green parties, whereby NGO’s receive more support from 
green parties than social democrats. For trade unions we have a reverse situation, namely social-
democratic support is more pronounced than green support.  
But what exactly produces these differences? In the interviews interest group officials got 
questions on their involvement in twenty different trade issues in the field of agriculture, services 
and metal/steel. Each issue was presented as a potential controversy regarding single-peaked 
preferences actors could have regarding existing or future policies and potential policy outcomes. 
So issues involve a pro-con decision about a policy option. For each of these issues in which 
actors were involved interviewers asked one question concerning the policy images an interest 
group relates to this particular issue. The question was phrased as follows: 
There are different reasons and arguments as to why someone may favor or oppose 
policies. In your external communication you may have emphasized different reasons and 
arguments. Broadly speaking we distinguish between values, technical arguments and 
political reasons. I will show a set of arguments and ask you to indicate whether these 
arguments were used in the positive sense, in the negative sense or whether they are not 
applicable for the position you communicated to the outside world.  
 
A policy image concerns ‘how a policy is understood and discussed’ (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993, 24-7). The importance of policy images is that they shape the arguments needed for 
political persuasion. Much political activity concerns attempts to manipulate the terms of a 
political debate; by emphasizing and defining issues in particular ways actors try to shift the 
focus of attention from one set of consequences to another. For instance, with regard to 
‘immigration’ it makes a considerable difference whether policymakers label issues as ‘security 
problems’ or ‘problems of cultural integration’, on the one hand, or as ‘social-economic 
  18problems’ or ‘labor market problems’, on the other hand. One implication is that these different 
images stimulate the involvement of different actors (Kloor 2005).  If immigration is connected 
to ‘security problems’, then often ‘law-and-order’ departments (the ministries of justice, home 
affairs and justice) gain a bigger stake in the policy process. In contrast, relating immigration to 
‘labor market problems’ stimulates the involvement of other agencies such as the ministry of 
social affairs. Another consequence is that agencies develop different policies in response to 
different images. For instance, in case immigration is defined as a problem of ‘cultural 
integration and adaptation’ educational curricula will highlight more the ‘adoption of our values 
and norms’, while an emphasis on ‘labor market integration’ increases the attention for 
vocational training.  
For each trade issue in which actors were involved the interviewers checked the reasons 
and arguments as to why the organization favored or opposed the policy outcomes interviewers 
confronted them with. For instance, respondents could argue that they were in favor or against 
something because it destroys/creates employment. For the moment, I ignore the political 
positions – in favor or against some potential outcome – adopted by interest groups. In figure 2 I 
associate some key images with the interest group type and in figure 3 I relate the same data with 
the received support from political parties. It is interesting to see how information about only 
policy images yields interesting observations. Figure 2 shows that the ‘health’ and the 
‘environment’ image are predominantly used by NGOs. The ‘consumer’ image is, although more 
equally distributed, somewhat less used by employers’ unions. Traditional economic arguments 
about ‘competitiveness’, ‘employment’ and ‘economic growth’ are common among trade unions 
and business associations. Finally, there are some relevant findings with regard to ‘members’ and 
‘public opinion’. Among the three categories, NGOs are least likely to use the argument ‘it is 
good/bad for our members and constituents’, while trade unions are most likely to use this image. 
Employers and trade unions differ considerably from NGOs; compared to the latter, the former 
pay more explicit attention to the consequences of policies for their members and constituencies. 
Although members and constituencies are of key importance for employers’ unions, it appears 
that employers’ unions are least likely to rely on information about the public opinion.  
Figure 3 displays the same policy images and relates these to political support relations. I 
consider four categories of support relations: support from Christian-democrats, from social-
democrats, from liberals and from greens. The images ‘public health’, ‘environment’ and 
  19‘consumers’ are significantly more used among interest groups with regular political support 
from green parties or social-democratic parties, while the image ‘competitiveness’ is more 
prevalent among liberals and Christian-democrats. The other two economic images, 
‘employment’ and ‘economic growth’, do not result in a clear picture. ‘Employment’ is highly 
valued by all actors, although it is somewhat less accentuated by the greens. Something similar 
happens with ‘economic growth’, an image used by all groups, except those that gain political 
support from green parties. Finally, organizations with support from Christian-democrats and 
liberals – mainly employers’ unions – make extensive use of the constituency image, while those 
who gain green and social-democratic support tend to relate their policy position with the fact 
that ‘public opinion is in favor/against it’.  
  20Figure 1. Type of interest group and politcal support
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Figure 2. Comparing policy images and three types of interest groups
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Figure 3. Comparing policy images and support relations
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Index figure 2 and 3: Policy images under consideration concern: 
-  public health: it is good/bad for public health 
-  environment: it is good/bad for the environment 
-  consumers: it promotes/disadvantages the consumer’s interest 
-  competitiveness: it is good/bad for our competitiveness 
-  employment: it contributes to/destroys employment 
-  growth: it promotes/impairs economic growth 
-  members: it is good/bad for our members and constituents 
-  public: public opinion is in favor/against it 
 
One of the weak points of the analysis so far is that I use quite broad categories which in 
themselves conceal much heterogeneity. For instance, the category ‘NGOs’ includes consumer 
interests as well as development NGOs and environment NGOs. The broad categories ‘trade 
union’ and ‘employers’ do not take into account sectoral differences. Moreover, the univariate 
and bivariate comparisons may conceal a multidimensional structure of the policy space. It seems 
that two or three dimensions prevail: a business or pro-growth coalition clustered around 
Christian-democrats and liberals, a social policy coalition with trade unions and social-democrats 
and a pro-sustainability coalition of NGOs supported by green parties. Nonetheless, it remains 
unclear to what extent the last two clusters are really distinct. Although there is considerable 
overlap in terms of political support (see table 3) and regarding the policy images ‘health’, 
‘environment’ and ‘consumers’, it look as if affiliates of greens and social-democrats differ with 
respect to the images ‘competitiveness’, ‘employment’ and ‘economic growth’.  
In order to clarify this, I analyze a concatenated frequency table with correspondence 
analysis, an inductive technique for the analysis of adjacency matrices (for technical details 
Greenacre and Blasius 1994). Instead of using three types of interest groups, I subdivide the 
interest group population into fourteen different sectoral categories. For each of these categories I 
take the number of organizations with regular support from four types of political parties – 
Christian-democrats, greens, social-democrats and liberals – as column variables. 
Correspondence analysis results in a geometric and spatial representation of the distances 
between rows (fourteen different types of interest groups) and columns (four types of political 
parties sending regular support the groups in the columns). These distances reflect association 
between rows and columns. As in factor analysis, correspondence analysis seeks to account for 
the maximum amount of association along one axis (the so-called first component or dimension); 
then it aims to account to a maximum amount of association for another axis (the second 
component or dimension) and so on.  
  22In the analysis presented here, I combine the German, French, Belgian, Dutch and EU-
level data, but for future analyses I may conduct separate analyses for each country. Figure 4 
plots the first two dimensions which together explain 98% of the variance in the table. Two 
aspects are crucial when interpreting the results of a correspondence analysis. First, when two 
rows or two columns are close to each other, they are characterized by a low Chi
2-distance. In 
terms my analysis it implies that if interest group types are plotted close to each other, they gain a 
similar amount of support from the same political parties. Second, rows that are plotted close to 
columns show a low Chi
2-distance. So features of rows (in this analysis: fourteen types of interest 
groups) are interpreted by features of columns (in this analysis: four party families) or vice versa. 
For instance, if some type of interest groups lies far away from a particular party, it means that 
this interest group type does not regularly receive support from this party.  
 
Figure 4. Mapping distances between interest groups and political parties 
(correspondance analysis)
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  23The figure shows that the structure of conflict with regard to EU trade policies does not 
completely overlap with a traditional bipolar left-right structure. Instead, we may consider a 
triangular structure in which three clusters or alliances can be distinguished; labor, business and 
environment. The data illustrate two insights. To begin with, it appears that the first dimension 
(plotted on the X-axis) runs between economic liberalism and a large cluster which we might 
label as ‘leftist’. On the left side of the picture, there are only employers associations, the liberals 
and the Christian-democrats, a cluster which might be labeled ‘rightist’. On the right side of the 
plot, there is ‘everything else’ which includes actors in favor of national socio-economic 
protectionism (or welfare state protectionism) as well as pro-ecology and consumer interests. The 
Y-axis, however, shows not that much divergence among the ‘economic right’; the distances 
among liberals, Christian-democrats and their affiliates are very small. Within the left camp, 
there is some divergence with, on the one hand, trade unions and social-democrats somewhat at 
the bottom and greens and NGOs at the top. Yet, the plot is somewhat misleading as it uses a 
different scale for the X- and the Y-axis. The distance between consumer NGOs and trade unions 
in the metal sector is approximately .07 on the Y-axis (which is close to the distance between the 
agriculture producers and the food industry on the X-axis), while the distance between 
development NGOs and the food industry on the X-axis is almost .15. In sum, there is much more 
differentiation between ‘left’ and ‘right’ than between top and bottom, which leads me to 
conclude that one single dimension tends to dominate the political space. The two separate 
clusters on the left (right side of the plot) – the sustainability and pro-social coalitions – are 
different in terms of political images as well as political support networks, but these differences 
are smaller than the distinction between ‘left’ and ‘right’ and so they can be subsumed within one 
dimension. True, both employers and trade unions share policy images such as ‘economic 
growth’ and ‘employment’, but their connections to different political parties as well as the 
affinity of trade unions with social-democratic parties moves the trade unions away from 
employers’ unions.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper reveals that party cleavages considerably affect support relations between 
interest groups and political parties. The data show that an overarching left-right conflict 
dimension structures the overall interaction among interest groups and political parties. This 
  24finding is relevant as it rejects the notion that the interactions between parties and interest groups 
primarily concern issue-based lobbying in which the idiosyncratic feature of each separate issue 
is central. The data suggest that the influence production process is structured and constrained by 
some straightforward ideological and cognitive cues which interest group officials can use as 
shortcuts. The policy space consists primarily of three coalitions: a business or pro-growth 
coalition clustered around Christian-democrats and liberals, a social policy coalition with trade 
unions and social-democrats and a pro-sustainability coalition of NGOs supported by green 
parties. Despite this three-fold distinction, the analysis leads to the conclusion that one left-right 
dimension tends to dominate the political space. The sustainability and pro-social coalitions 
differ in terms of political images as well as political support networks, but these differences 
remain rather smaller and can be subsumed within one dimension.  
It could be argued that the one-dimensional structure of the policy space is an artifact of 
the sample and/or policy domain, namely trade policies, on which the analysis is based. Of 
course, this analysis does not completely exclude the possibility that other policy domains or 
political systems are featured by a two or three-dimensional conflict space (for instance see 
Pellikaan et al. 2003; Haarhuis and Torenvlied 2006). On the contrary, as different domains as 
well as polities are characterized by varying formal and informal institutional rules, it is likely 
that the conflict structure may vary accordingly. The results in this paper are relevant as they 
demonstrate the low dimensionality and the importance of party cleavages for a policy space in a 
domain (external trade policies) and at a level (the EU-level) where party cleavages do not get 
much academic attention. Also the fact that the structure of the policy space is very similar across 
countries and levels, shows that we can confidently speak of a European system of interest group 
politics. What is observed in one country is usually reproduced elsewhere and it is translated 
quite well to the EU-level.  
As the results suggest the potential importance of a low dimensional cleavage structure 
for interest group politics, the subsequent analysis has to focus on how these findings relate to the 
political strategies interest groups adopt. It would be interesting to have a more in-depth insight 
in the relation of support relation with access networks, inside lobbying and outside lobbying. For 
instance, do NGOs indeed have extensive exchange networks with green parties or social 
democratic parties? Which resources (money, members, expertise) are important in such 
exchanges? Do these resources differ from the resources mobilized by business interest when 
  25they approach liberal parties? And to which coalition belong those who experience more (or less) 
conflict? Some more detailed theory-driven case-studies and statistical analyses are needed for 
answering these questions. As the analyses in this paper demonstrate, the systematic interviewing 
of political elites is a promising tool in order to generate systematic answers to such questions.  
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  30Endnotes 
                                                 
1 It is especially since the strong opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992-93, the 
demise of the negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1997-98, and the resistance to the 
(abortive) effort to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations at the Ministerial Conference of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in September 1999 – the so-called “Battle of Seattle” – that trade has caught 
the attention of more than just a small group of activists and business associations. Indeed, as part of the political 
mobilization against globalization and/or its effects, trade liberalization has become a discredited and regularly 
contested policy, as is its multilateral venue, the WTO. 
2 The focus is thereby on the efforts these groups make to influence the EU’s external trade policies in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), more particularly in the areas of agriculture, steel/metal and services. These countries 
represent advanced export-oriented economies with a long and – as founding members of the EU – a shared and 
similar tradition of multi-lateral co-operation. They differ, however, on some key variables. There is of course the 
difference between small and large or medium-sized countries. A more important variation though, concerns the 
varying policy positions of these countries on trade liberalization, ranging on a continuum from a great reserve 
(France) to a small reserve (the Netherlands). France, for instance, traditionally shows some reluctance and 
skepticism with regard to further trade liberalization while the Netherlands has traditionally been more in favor. 
Germany and Belgium are located somewhere in between these two countries, with Belgium being more reluctant 
towards trade liberalization than the Netherlands, and Germany being more positive on trade liberalization than 
France. This variation is not only reflected in official government policies of these countries, it is also visible in their 
respective public opinions on trade (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). A comparison between the interest groups system 
and how this interacts with party and government officials may thus yield interesting results. 
3 This research project also includes public officials and how they interact with interest groups, but because public 
officials are not directly relevant for the problem dealt with in this paper, I do not pay extensive attention to the 
interviews conducted with them.  
4 Because the larger project deals with trade policymaking, the research team focused primarily on sources which list 
interest groups that are potentially active in this sector. The WTO-website (www.wto.org) contains a number of 
useful sources ranging from listings of interest groups and civil society organizations attending ministerial 
conferences, expert meetings, position papers delivered to the WTO and so on. These sources included:  
-  Joint UNCTAD WTO Symposium (September 1997), to prepare for the High Level Meeting on Least-
Developed Countries, 
-  Symposium on Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development (1998), 
-  Ministerial Conference Geneva (1998), 
-  Third Ministerial Conference Seattle (30/11-3/12 1999), 
-  Work session on services (06/07/01), 
-  Work session on Trips-access to essential medicines (06/07/01), 
-  Work session on food safety and the SPS agreement (07/07/01), 
-  NGO’s attending the Ministerial Conference in Doha (2001), 
-  Public Symposium Doha Development Agenda and Beyond (29/04/02 – 01/05/02), 
-  All position papers for the period 27/10/1998 – 13/11/2002. 
From all these sources we selected the lists of attendance for the Euro-level, Belgian, French, German and Dutch 
actors. Second, DG Trade of the European Commission has established a Civil Society Dialogue, an open process of 
consultation to which interest groups may subscribe (http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/civil_soc/intro1.php). Also from this 
source Euro-level, Belgian, French, German and Dutch actors were retained. Third, all interest groups listed in a 
policy event data set developed for the purpose of this project were coded. Fourthly, Euro-level, Belgian, French, 
German and Dutch actors listed in the WTO-history project conducted by a research team at the University of 
Washington were included (http://depts.washington.edu/wtohist).  
5 However, it should be noted that some of the sources, such as the EU’s Civil Society Dialogue, have a very low 
access barrier as it mainly functions as a registration database. 
6 In addition also 146 representatives of government institutions, parliamentarians and political parties were 
interviewed, but these interviews are not analyzed in this paper. The same project also includes 139 EU-level interest 
groups and public officials. 
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